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Clara Shortridge Foltz: Angel and Revolutionary
Deborah H. King*
[T]he phantom was a woman, and... I called her after the heroine
of a famous poem, The Angel in the House .... She was intensely
sympathetic. She was immensely charming. She was utterly
unselfish. She excelled in the difficult arts of family life. She
sacrificed herself daily .... [Sihe was so constituted that she never
had a mind or a wish of her own, but preferred to sympathize
always with the minds and wishes of others. Above all.., she was
pure .... Her purity was supposed to be her chief beauty .... In
those days-the last of Queen Victoria-every house had its
Angel.... [Slhe slipped behind me and whispered: "My dear, you
are a young woman. You are writing about a book that has been
written by a man. Be sympathetic; be tender; flatter; deceive; use
all the arts and wiles of our sex. Never let anybody guess that you
have a mind of your own. Above all, be pure. "
_ Virginia Woolf'
*B.A., University of New Hampshire (1994); J.D., candidate, University of California,
Hastings College of the Law, class of 2000. I am deeply grateful to Professor Schiller who
was always ready to read drafts, challenged me as a historian and helped me find the
courage to "step up to the plate." I thank Allison Schutte (who has her own connection to
Foltz-she revitalized the Clara Foltz Feminist Association in 1997), Christine DeSimone,
Heather Kirlin, Raquel Lacayo-Va~le, Damara Moore, Karolyn Plummer and Stacy Tyler for
editing my note. I also thank my husband for his never-ending patience.
1. Virginia Woolf, Professions for Women, in 2 THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY OF ENGLISH
LrrERATuRE 1987-88 (M.H. Abrams et al. eds., 6th ed. 1993) [hereinafter NORTON]. Woolf
eventually killed the Angel:
I turned upon her and caught her by the throat; I did my best to kill her. My
excuse, if I were to be had up on a court of law, would be that that I acted in
self-defence. Had I not killed her she would have killed me.... She died
hard. Her fictitious nature was of great assistance to her. It is far harder to
kill a phantom than a reality. She was always creeping back when I thought
I had dispatched her. Though I flatter myself that I killed her in the end, the
struggle was severe .... But it was a real experience; it was an experience
that was bound to befall all women writers at the time. Killing the Angel in
the House was part of the occupation of a woman writer.
Id. at 1988. The poem Woolf refers to is by Coventry Patmore, The Angel in the House. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Clara Shortridge Foltz has been described in many ways. Her
contemporaries called her the "lady lawyer."2 Newspapers used phrases
such as "matronly, ' 3 "without a trace of mannish affectation,' 4 "nothing
indicative of the strong minded woman about her"5 and "genteelly attired"
6
to describe her. Her biography in the History of the Bar and Bench of
California refers to her as "wearing always the jewel of true womanhood."7
A modem writer, Thomas Barnes, described her as "assertive,
8
"pugnacious, ' 9 "a massive egotist ' 10 and "the antithesis of everything that
Victorian convention believed a gentlewoman should be."' Barbara
Babcock describes Foltz's life as "confused, her vision clouded," 12 but also
calls her a "representative heroine. ' 3
What these various labels indicate is that Clara Shortridge Foltz was a
complicated person, with many personas, with many different
achievements and who can be interpreted in many different ways. For
example, in Hastings College of the Law, The First Century, Barnes
interprets her as overly aggressive, not reflective of her time and implies
that she was an unpleasant person, 14 though he does admit that she was a
"formidable Californian"' 15 and acknowledges her suffrage work and efforts
to open Hastings to women. 16 However, he also wrote that her monthly
column, Struggles and Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer, "revealed some
paranoia, an absence of graciousness either in victory or defeat, and a
at 1599.
2. Clara Shortridge Foltz, Struggles and Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer, NEW AM.
WOMAN, Oct. 1916, at 11 [hereinafter Struggles]. See also Woman's Rights, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 25, 1879, at 1; Aspiring Lady Lawyers, DAILY ALTA CALIFORNIA, Feb. 25, 1879, at 1;
The Lady Lawyer, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 6, 1879, at 3; The Lady Lawyers, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
15, 1879, at2.
3. Woman at the Bar, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 30, 1879, at 3.
4. N.Y. TMBS, Jan. 17, 1896, quoted in Barbara Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz:
"First Woman," 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 1231, 1275 (1994) [hereinafter Babcock, First
Woman].
5. Woman at the Bar, supra note 3.
6. Woman's Rights, supra note 2.
7. HISTORY OF THE BENCH AND BAR OF CALIFORNIA 832 (Oscar T. Shuck ed., 1901)
[hereinafter BENCH AND BAR].
8. THOMAS G. BARNES, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW: THE FIRST CENTURY 49
(1978).
9. Id. at 49.
10. Id.
11. Id. at47.
12. Barbara Babcock, Reconstructing the Person: The Case of Clara Shortridge Foltz, in
REVEALING LIVES: AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND GENDER 131, 139 (Susan Groag Bell & Marilyn
Yalom eds., 1990) [hereinafter Babcock, Reconstructing].
13. Id. at 140.
14. "But there was an assertiveness about her that no one-not even her adherents and
allies throughout her long career-found appealing." BARNES, supra note 8, at 49.
15. Id. at 47.
16. See id. at 47-57.
HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:2
Summer 2000] FOLTZ: ANGEL AND REVOLUTIONARY 181
compulsion to take credit for everything that had been achieved in the
[suffrage] movement of California."'17 Barnes prefers Hastings' first female
graduate, Mary McHenry Keith, describing her as "less strident, more
retiring in personality, more graceful and gracious than Clara Shortridge
Foltz, she was also more effective in the feminist cause."
18
Barbara Babcock, who proclaims herself to be Foltz's biographer,
presents a much different picture of Foltz.19 Her picture is different in part
because Babcock creates more detailed pictures of portions of Foltz's life.
It is from Babcock's painstaking research that we learn of Foltz's early life,
her role in the suffrage movement, her struggles to enter the legal
profession, the drafting and passage of the Woman's Lawyer Bill, her role
in the California Constitutional Convention in 1878, her divorce and her
role in challenging Hastings' policy to exclude women. Babcock's picture
is also different because she sees Foltz as an early feminist, a first woman
like Babcock herself.20 Babcock described Foltz as a woman who:
refus[ed] to admit either hard choices or mistakes... pursued
professional achievement and recognition, power and wealth, a
deeply conceived maternal role, a passionate and beauty-filled
life .... For the end of the twentieth century, Clara Shortridge
Foltz is, at last, a representative heroine.2 '
This is not to imply that Babcock ignores activities of Foltz's that we
as modem readers, with modem ideas, might feel uncomfortable about.
Babcock wrote that Foltz's tale was:
not the unadulterated triumph that she (and 1) might have wished.
The biographer's method.., also reveals the ignoble side of her
success. The political support that gave Foltz and her colleagues
their chance from 1877 to 1879 draw on an anti-Chinese racism of
such virulence that the women's complicity in it is impossible to
ignore.22
17. Id. at 49.
18. Id. at 61.
19. See Barbara Babcock, Symposium: National Conference on Judicial Biography
"Contracted" Biographies and other Obstacles to "Truth," 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 707, 707
(1995) [hereinafter Babcock, Biography].
20. See id. at 709. See also Barbara Babcock, Book Review, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1689, 1700 (1998) (reviewing VIRGINIA G. DRACEMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN
LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY (1998)); Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at
1233. Barbara Babcock was the first woman to head the Public Defender Service in
Washington, D.C., the first woman professor and the first woman to hold an endowed chair
at Stanford. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at n.a.
21. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 140.
22. Barbara Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz, Constitution-Maker, 66 Ind. L.J. 849, 853-
54 (1991) [hereinafter Babcock, Constitution-Maker]. Foltz wrote, "[the] Chinese were
everywhere fattening upon our soil, consuming our industries, while American labor went
hungry ...." Struggles, supra note 2, at 23.
Even with such a statement, Babcock's interpretation of Foltz is that of
a pioneer, a first, and a woman who can be a symbol to modem feminists.
A woman who rejected separate sphere ideology that stated that Foltz
should remain within the domestic sphere. This is very different from
Barnes' interpretation that Foltz, while a pioneer, was an unpleasant
woman and thus not the type of woman who should be emulated. The
question now becomes whether there is more to be said about Foltz,
whether there are other interpretations of her just as valid as those that
Barnes and Babcock have drawn.
The answer, ironically, is in opposition to a similarity between Barnes'
and Babcock's interpretations of Foltz. Barnes wrote that Foltz "was the
antithesis of everything that Victorian convention believed a gentlewoman
should be"23 and Babcock wrote, "the degree of confusion and conflict that
resulted [from Foltz's lack of an overarching sense of mission or a unifying
characteristic] was unusual in the late nineteenth century."24 Barnes sees
Foltz as unreflective of women in general and Babcock sees her as
unreflective of women in the women's movement.
Foltz and her struggles to come to terms with her internalization of
separate sphere ideology may in fact be very reflective of many Victorian
women. As Virginia Woolf would later write, it was not just traditional
women who had internalized the notions of separate sphere ideology but
also the women who entered the male sphere. Of her own attempts to
overcome these internalized notions, which she referred to as the Angel,
Woolf said, "[s]he was always creeping back when I thought I had
dispatched her. Though I flatter myself that I killed her in the end, the
struggle was severe. ... 25
Barbara Harris writes in Beyond Her Sphere "[m]any Victorian
Americans who rejected, or at least equivocated about, ideas of female
subordination and inferiority still advocated an exceedingly restricted role
for women, because they accepted fully the assumptions of the cult of true
womanhood., 26 I am not arguing that Foltz was advocating an exceedingly
restricted role for women, but rather that her internalization of separate
sphere ideology led her to believe that women had an uniquely female role
to fulfill: devoted wife and mother. Foltz also believed in confidently and
outspokenly confronting the notions inherent in the ideology of separate
spheres. Thus Foltz, like Woolf, struggled with the Angel. However,
unlike Woolf, Foltz never killed the Angel but instead embraced and
rejected the Angel. Foltz's inconsistent beliefs may make her reflective of
both Victorian gentlewomen and firsts.27
23. BARNES, supra note 8 at 47.
24. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12 at 140.
25. NORTON, supra note 1, at 1988.
26. BARBARA HARRIS, BEYOND HER SPHERE 56 (1978).
27. A great example of what we would see as inconsistent Victorian beliefs can be found
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The reality is that we will never really know what Foltz thought. This
is because most of Foltz's personal papers were destroyed after her death.28
In addition, Foltz was aware that she was a public figure and engineered a
public persona. Thus, it is often difficult to tell whether her statements are
what she believed or what she believed her public wanted to hear.
Nonetheless, it would have been nearly impossible for Foltz to have
completely escaped untouched from separate sphere ideology.
Babcock herself is aware that if she were to meet Foltz, Foltz might not
be exactly as Babcock has interpreted her. Babcock knows that her
interpretation of Foltz may in some ways be a reflection of how Babcock
views feminism and of what Babcock wanted to find when she set out to be
Foltz's biographer:
The infatuation of a biographer for his subject can distort
interpretation. I love Clara Foltz, and find that "to her virtues I'm
very kind" and "to her faults a little blind." And of course my
desire as a feminist to supply a historical model for today's women
lawyers influences me as well. In fact, trying to put the "hag" back
into hagiography is a major preoccupation.29
In my effort to understand Foltz, I have taken a different route than
Babcock. Section II provides an overview of Foltz's life so that her
achievements, of which there are many, may be recognized. Section In
presents the general discourse regarding the role of women in society and
explores how separate sphere ideology impacted women in the areas of
marriage, education and employment, as these were areas where Foltz
herself encountered these notions. Section III also examines
contemporaneous criticism of separate sphere ideology, as well as how the
law and the ideology intersected. The purpose of Section I is to provide
the reader with context for Foltz, since modem readers are often not aware
of the pervasive nature of separate sphere ideology. The concept that
separate sphere ideology would have impacted almost everything Foltz did
and how she viewed her culture is vital to understanding her struggles.
Section IV analyzes three ways Foltz reacted to separate sphere ideology:
confronting it, engineering a persona in order to exploit it and embracing it.
in Mary Kingsley. Kingsley traveled alone throughout Africa studying cultures of different
African tribes. She thought there was no reason a woman should not do this and gave
lectures to young women encouraging them to do the same. However, Kingsley did not
believe that women should vote (in fact she liked to harass the suffragettes) or do
unwomanly things like travel through the jungles of Africa in anything less than a full
corset. See KATERiNE FRANK, A VOYAGER OUT: THE LIFE OF MARY KINGSLEY (1986).
28. See Mortimer D. Schwartz et al., Clara Shortridge Foltz: Pioneer in the Law, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 546,564 (1976).
29. Babcock, Biography, supra note 19, at 709. The phrases, "to her virtues I'm very
ind" and "to her faults a little blind" are lines from a poem that Foltz often quoted. Id. at
n.8.
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I1. CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ'S LIFE
30
Clara Shortridge Foltz was born on July 16, 1849, in Indiana to Elias
and Talitha Shortridge. 31 Her father worked as a lawyer, and shortly before
the Civil War became a Cambellite Minister and moved the family to
Mount Pleasant, Iowa.32 In Iowa, Foltz gained her only formal education at
Howe's Academy, which she attended for just three years.33 After
attending school, Foltz was briefly a teacher.34 Her teaching career ended
when the then Shortridge, at age fifteen, eloped with Jeremiah Foltz, a
Union soldier.35  Foltz and Jeremiah lived and worked a farm in Iowa,
where Foltz bore her first three children by the age of nineteen.30
In January 1872, with three young children, 37 Foltz followed her
husband to Portland, Oregon.3 8 It is unclear why Jeremiah left Iowa
without Foltz, but Foltz was described as being "in search of her
husband., 39 When Foltz found Jeremiah he was working as a store clerk
for "starvation wages. 'Ao To help support the family, Foltz took in boarders
41
and worked as a seamstress. In 1875, the family moved to San Jose,
California, where Foltz bore her fifth child.42 Jeremiah again found work
as a store clerk.43 The move may not have been Jeremiah's idea,44 as he
30. I am deeply indebted to Barbara Babcock for her work as biographer of Clara
Shortridge Foltz. Her articles Clara Shortridge Foltz: Constitution-Maker, Clara
Shortridge Foltz: "First Woman" and Reconstructing the Person: The Case of Clara
Shortridge Foltz provide very detailed accounts of Foltz's life. Babcock, Constitution-
Maker, supra note 22; Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4; and Babcock, Reconstructing,
supra note 12. This section draws heavily on her work in order to create a comprehensive
reconstruction of Foltz's life. For Foltz's later years, I relied on the article Clara Shortridge
Foltz: Pioneer in the Law, by Mortimer D. Schwartz, Susan L. Brandt and Patience Milrod.
Schwartz et al., supra note 28.
31. See Schwartz et al., supra note 28, at 546 n.10.
32. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1246 n.58.
33. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1234 & n.9; Babcock, Constitution-
Maker, supra note 22, at 859 & n.31.
34. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 859.
35. See id. at 859.
36. See Struggles, supra note 2, Apr. 1916, at 10; Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra
note 22, at 859.
37. One was only nine weeks old. See Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 133.
38. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1239; Babcock, Constitution-Maker,
supra note 22, at 859.
39. Letter from Oregon, RECORD-UNION (Sacramento), Feb. 25, 1879, at 1, quoted in
Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1239.
40. Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 861.
41. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1239-40; Babcock, Constitution-Maker,
supra note 22, at 861.
42. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1240; Babcock, Constitution-Maker,
supra note 22, at 860.
43. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 860.
44. However, Barbara Babcock in Reconstructing hypothesizes that Jeremiah might have
been drawn to the large German community in San Jose. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra
note 12, at 134.
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made repeated trips back to Oregon.45
In San Jose, Foltz was active in the suffrage movement and made
friends with prominent San Jose suffragette Sarah Knox.46 Friends like
Knox facilitated Foltz's access to suffrage activities and ensured that she
met "all the celebrities that visited San Jose." 47 She attended lectures by
Susan B. Anthony, Mary A. Livermore and Lillie Deveraux Blake.48 Foltz
even attempted to vote with Knox in 1877.49
In addition to her suffrage activities Foltz obtained a paid fire
department for San Jose in 1876.50 She was afraid the volunteer systeni
was inefficient and "all the houses in town might bum up while the boys
were getting out of bed and into their clothes." 51 It was through her efforts
to establish the fire department that Foltz met Barney Murphy, the Mayor
of San Jose. Murphy would later help Foltz with her quest to change the
California Code of Civil Procedure.52 Foltz also dealt with a nuisance issue
by consulting with San Jose lawyer C.C. Stephens, who would also later
prove to be a valuable male ally.53
Jeremiah's wages were not enough to support the family of seven.
Instead of taking in sewing or boarders as she had done in Oregon, Foltz
turned to lecturing to create supplemental income.54 As Babcock points out
Foltz had a ready made audience in San Jose-her family,55 friends and
suffrage supporters.56 She gave her first lecture there in 1877.57 It is not
surprising that Foltz turned to lecturing as she frequently recounted her
early dreams of "oratory, fame or political recognition. 58 Foltz's first
speech was on suffrage, entitled The Political Emancipation of Women.59
Over the next two years Foltz lectured in various cities in California and
45. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 860; Babcock, Reconstructing,
supra note 12, at 134. These trips were probably to visit the woman Jeremiah would marry
after his divorce from Foltz. See Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 134.
46. Knox was the widow of William Knox, a California senator who had drafted and
supported a bill that allowed married women to dispose of their own property by will. See
Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1240-41; Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note
22, at 861.
47. Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1242-43; Struggles, supra note 2, May 1916,
at 16.
48. Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1242-43.
49. See id. at 1242.
50. See id. at 1247; Struggles, supra note 2, May 1916, at 16.
51. Struggles, supra note 2, May 1916, at 16.
52. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1246-47.
53. See Struggles, supra note 2, May 1916, at 16.
54. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1243-44; Babcock, Constitution-Maker,
supra note 22, at 861.
55. Foltz's parents and four brothers followed the Foltz family first to Oregon and then to
California. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 860.
56. See id. at 861.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 860 & n.34.
59. Id. at 861.
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Oregon, arguing for suffrage and the right of women to practice the law.60
Foltz was an excellent orator, receiving reviews such as "the most brilliant
speech ever delivered by a lady orator in this city.
61
When Foltz decided to seriously pursue studying the law, she applied
to study with prominent San Francisco lawyer, Francis Spencer.62 At the
time there were two ways to prepare for a career in the law: attending a law
63
school or studying with a practitioner. Since California did not have a
law school until 1878, Foltz's only option was to apprentice with a
lawyer.64 Foltz wrote to prominent San Francisco lawyer Francis Spencer,
asking if she could be a student in his office.65 Foltz believed that Spencer
would welcome her,66 but he did not. In fact, Spencer pleaded with Foltz to
abandon her attempt to study law and recommended that she stay at home
or teach.67 Foltz persevered, eventually studying with San Jose attorney
C.C. Stephens.
68
While Foltz had found an attorney who was willing to take her on as an
apprentice she could not legally practice as the California Code of Civil
Procedure only allowed men to be members of the bar.69 In response, Foltz
drafted The Woman's Lawyer Bill, which replaced the statutory language
"white male" with the gender-neutral term "person., 70 Foltz convinced
Barney Murphy, who was by then a senator, to submit the Bill to the
California Senate.
On December 3, 1877, the legislative session started. Two weeks into
the session, Foltz witnessed Murphy present her Bill to the Senate.71 Foltz
was in Sacramento with Laura deForce Gordon72 to ensure the passage of
60. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 861. Other titles included
Impartial Suffrage, Impartial Citizenship, Political Liberty, Why Women Need the Ballot,
Women and Work and Equality of the Sexes. Id. at n.39.
61. Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1244 & n.51.
62. See Struggles, supra note 2, June 1916, at 5.
63. See VIRGINA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN
AMERICAN HISTORY 39 (1998); BARNES, supra note 8, at 39.
64. See BARNES, supra note 8, at 17.
65. See Struggles, supra note 2, June 1916, at 5.
66. "Patiently, and I confess confidently, (optimist as I was, and am), I wvaited for the
answer from Judge Spencer, the while making all preparations for the beginning of my
student work in his big fine offices .... ." Id.
67. See id.
68. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1246.
69. See id. See also Schwartz et al., supra note 28, at 547.
70. The enacted version read:
Any citizen or person resident of this State who has bona fide declared his or
her intention to become a citizen in the manner required by law, of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission as attorney and
counselor in all the Courts of this State.
Act of Apr. 1, 1878, ch. 600, § 1, Cal. Stat. 1878, repealed by State Bar Act of 1931, now
revised at Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6060 (West 1999).
71. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1248.
72. Gordon was another divorced suffragette who also wanted to practice law. See
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the Bill.73  Not surprisingly, the Bill was met with opposition.74  The
Sacramento Daily Bee wrote that women "are not successful in their
professions [because] all women hope to marry and be supported by their
husbands." 75 This must have discouraged and aggravated Foltz, as her
husband was unable to support her and her children.
In January the Bill was passed by the Senate with the support of the
Sacramento Bar and the State Suffrage Society.76 However, the Bill did not
fare so well in the Assembly, where the vote was defeated. Foltz missed
the Assembly vote as she was traveling in Oregon lecturing and visiting her
husband in what was probably an effort to rescue her marriage.77 Jeremiah
made frequent trips to Oregon between 1878 and 1879, apparently to visit
the woman who would become his second wife.
78
Two days before the legislative session was to end, the Assembly
reconsidered the Bill.79 Foltz, now back from Oregon, lobbied for the Bill
with two of her children in tow.80 The Bill passed and Foltz convinced
Governor Irwin to sign the Bill on April 1, 1878. 81 The Governor also
signed another piece of legislation that spring that would prove important
to Foltz-it created Hastings College of the Law. 2
With legislation in place allowing her to become a lawyer, Foltz
returned to San Jose and began studying for the bar.83 The exam was oral
and was administered by C.C. Stephens, the attorney she had studied with,
D.W. Herrington, and Francis Spencer, the attorney who had refused to
accept Foltz as a student.84 Foltz was not troubled by the fact that Spencer
was on her examination committee and passed the three hour exam easily:
"the committee passed me with highly colored compliments, and I was
accordingly advised to appear before Judge Belden the following morning
and take the prescribed oath for lawyers. 85 On September 5, 1878, Foltz
became the first female lawyer in California. 6
Foltz immediately had clients, in part due to the publicity surrounding
Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 866.
73. Sarah Knox-Goodrich and others lobbied for the Bill and gathered signatures for
petitions. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1250.
74. See id. at 1251.
75. SACRAMENTO DAILY BEE, Dec. 19, 1877, at 2, quoted in Babcock, First Woman,
supra note 4, at 1248.
76. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1250-51.
77. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1255-56.
78. See Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 134.
79. After the Bill was defeated, a wise supporter switched his vote so he could later call
for the Bill to be reconsidered. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1255.
80. See id. at 1256.
81. See id. at 1256-57.
82. See id. at 1258-59. The Hastings Legislation was signed on March 26, 1878. 1d.
83. See id. at 1259.
84. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1261.
85. Struggles, supra note 2, Oct. 1916, at 11.
86. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1261.
her crusade to become a lawyer, and in part because of her influential
87friends. Regardless of the fact that she had clients and even though she
had already passed the bar, Foltz decided to attend the newly formed law
school because she felt self-conscious about her lack of formal education.
Foltz applied in the fall of 1878, and the Board of Trustees at their fall
meeting postponed any decision regarding Foltz until January.88 Foltz was
busy with clients and lobbying for suffrage with Gordon in Sacramento,
where the California Constitutional Convention 9 was occurring, and
therefore did not attend any classes until January 1879.90 Foltz attended the
first three days of classes (Laura deForce Gordon attended the second and
third days with her) until she received a letter from the Registrar that the
Directors had decided that Hastings would not be open to women.
91
Foltz and Gordon unsuccessfully tried to convince the school's
founder, Judge Hastings, and the Trustees that Hastings should admit
women. When their attempts failed, the women sued the College to
compel their admission.92 First, Foltz was required to undergo another bar
exam, as the San Francisco judge would not accept her bar admission
certificate from the San Jose Court.93 Once Foltz passed the bar exam, she
filed suit against Hastings on February 10, 1879.94
The hearing was set for February 15, 1879. Laura deForce Gordon had
also filed suit against Hastings, and the judge allowed the cases to be
consolidated, but also granted Hastings' request for a continuance until
February 21st. On the twenty-first, Hastings was granted another
continuance until February 24th. 95 While the delay caused Foltz to cry in
court and miss more of the semester, the delay gave the Constitutional
Convention delegates time to pass an amendment relating to employment
discrimination (written by Gordon), which stated, "[n]o person shall, on
account of sex, be disqualified from entering upon or pursuing any lawful
business, vocation or profession.'96 This clause bolstered Foltz's argument
that if California was going to allow women to practice the law, it also
should allow them to learn the law at the sole law school in the state.
On February 24th, Foltz was finally able to make her argument. Her
argument had three parts: that she met the requirements for admission to
Hastings, that Hastings was a part of the University of California system
87. See id. at 1263.
88. See BARNES, supra note 8, at 47.
89. The women were unsuccessful in their campaign for the vote at the Convention. See
Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 884.
90. See Babcock First Woman, supra note 4, at 1264.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1266.
93. See id. at 1271.
94. See Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 890.
95. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1273.
96. Quoted in Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 891.
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which admitted women, and that, with the passage of The Woman's
Lawyer Bill, it simply did not make any sense to deny women a legal
education when California law allowed women to practice law.9 7 Her
opposition did not address Foltz's legal points but cited the Lavina Goodell
case 98 which stated that women were unfit to practice the law.99
On February 26th, Foltz and Gordon were again helped by the
Constitutional Convention delegates when they passed the following
amendment: "[N]o person should be debarred admission to any of the
collegiate departments of the university on account of sex.''I°  Judge
Morrison ruled for Foltz and Gordon on March 6, 1879.101
Even though the law clearly supported the women and against the
opinion of Judge Hastings, the Trustees decided to appeal the decision. 02
Before the California Supreme Court heard the case, Foltz returned to San
Jose to practice law and was elected the President of the Women's Suffrage
Association.10 3 On December 6, 1879, Foltz passed the bar examination
required to argue before the California Supreme Court.1°4 The court in
Foltz v. Hoge found that because women were entitled by law to be
attorneys, and as the College was founded to educate those seeking
admission to the bar or already admitted, the College had to admit
women.105 It was fortunate that the court included the language "already
admitted," as after the women won at the district level, the Hastings'
Trustees passed a motion that would have barred attorneys admitted to
practice before the California Supreme Court from matriculating. 1°6 It was
the final attempt by Hastings to exclude Foltz from the College. 107
Though the school could no longer legally exclude Foltz, she no longer
had the finances to attend the College. 08 Instead, she took the position of
counsel to the Assembly Judiciary Committee in Sacramento. 0 9 The year
97. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1276.
98. See infra notes 208-10.
99. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1277-78.
100. Id. at 1274 & n.182.
101. See id. at 1280 & n.204.
102. See id. at 1281.
103. Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 903.
104. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1282.
105. 54 Cal. 28 (1879).
106. See BARNES, supra note 8, at 55.
107. Hastings never extended open arms to Clara Foltz. She asked for a degree in 1889
and in 1925, and was denied. See id. at 57. Barnes wrote in 1978 that "the old battler has
received a higher honor from the College than an honorary degree could every have
accorded: in the early 1970s, the women law students at Hastings renamed their
organization the Clara Shortridge Foltz Society... ' Id. Foltz finally received her degree
in 1991 after female students lobbied for the posthumous degree, which hangs in the library.
The organization is now called the Clara Foltz Feminist Association.
108. See Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1283.
109. See id. at 1283. She attended some lectures in 1880 after returning to San Francisco.
See id. at n.217
1879 held another disappointment for Foltz as well: she divorced Jeremiah,
and he re-married within two weeks of the decree. 110
Ensuring the passage of the Woman's Lawyer Bill and suing Hastings
for admission were not Foltz's only accomplishments: she lobbied for the
creation of the public defender system, introduced the Foltz Defender
Bill' in thirty-two states, and was the first female deputy district attorney
in Los Angeles. Foltz also advocated for the fair treatment of prisoners by
criticizing the practice of confining defendants in iron cages during their
trials and arguing for a parole system." 2
Foltz founded the San Diego Bee in 1887, which she actively edited
and published until 1890.113 Foltz moved her practice to Los Angeles in
1906, and while there published a magazine called The New American
Woman from 1916 to 1918. 14 Foltz continued to support the women's
suffrage movement by drafting suffrage legislation and working on the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment. 115 When she was eighty-one years
old, Foltz ran for Governor of California. While Foltz did not believe that
she would win, she believed her candidacy would draw attention to the
suffrage cause.1 6 Foltz died four years later in 1934.
I. THE DIALOGUE ABOUT WOMEN AND SEPARATE SPHERES
A. THE DOMINANT DIsCOURSE ABOUT WOMEN
Nineteenth century dialogue concerning women centered on the
validity or the invalidity, depending on who was speaking, of the idea that
men and women were destined to fulfill different roles. The theory was
that "God designed the sexes to occupy different spheres of action."' 7 The
male sphere was the public sphere, the world of business, profit and
politics, because men were creatures of reason, aggression and capable of
independent action. Women inhabited a world of feeling and
sentimentality. She was a moral creature, physically and mentally inferior
to men, l" 8 who was to selflessly devote her life to her husband and her
children.119 Women were not supposed to have roles that caused them to
enter the male sphere. However, women were not literally confined to the
110. See Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 134.
111. See Schwartz et al., supra note 28, at 557. The Foltz Defender Bill was model
legislation that created a public defender system. See id.
112. See id. at 556-58.
113. See id. at 563.
114. See id. at 560.
115. See id. at560.
116. See id. at561.
117. Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130, 132 (1872).
118. See Joellen Lind, Symbols, Leaders, Practitioners: The First Women Professionals,
28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1327, 1339 (1994).
119. See id.
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home. Women gathered in groups to work on causes such as public health,
temperance, education and child and female labor regulation. 120  Even
though these women were venturing beyond the home, they often portrayed
their efforts as supporting the institution of the home and the family.
2 1
Separate sphere ideology, as it applied to women-the idea that they
were supposed to stay within the home and dedicate their lives to their
husbands and children-is often referred to as the cult of domesticity.
122
What is important to remember about the cult of domesticity is that it was
an idea, a construct, by which society tried to define how women should
behave. It was not necessarily a reality for all women. The working class
poor, for instance, could not afford to adhere to the idea of separate
spheres.123 However, the notion of separate spheres had far reaching
effects upon middle class women like Clara Foltz.
1. Marriage, Divorce and Custody
The institution of marriage played an important role in most women's
lives. The relationship generally was viewed as one where women were
subservient. Catherine Beecher wrote:
[I]t is decided, that, in the domestic relation, she take a subordinate
station, and that, in civil and political concerns, her interests be
intrusted to the other sex, without her taking any part in voting, or
in making and administering the laws .... 124
The laws that regulated domestic relations were also influenced by
many of the notions incorporated into the cult of domesticity. Coverture,
the doctrine that the legal existence of married women was subsumed by
the legal existence of their husbands, was on the decline by the middle of
the nineteenth century, but remnants of the doctrine still remained. Justice
Bradley, in his concurrence denying Myra Bradwell the right to practice the
law, referred to the idea of coverture:
[S]o firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the common
law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a
woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was
regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and,
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status,
many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon
120. Nancy Cott, Introduction to ROOT OFBTERNESS 3, 26 (Nancy Cott ed., 1972).
121. See id.
122. See HARRIS, supra note 26, at 56.
123. See Nancy Cott, Introduction to ROOT OF BrrrERNESs, supra note 120, at 3, 13;
HARRIS, supra note 26, at 60.
124. CATHERINE E. BEECHER, On The Peculiar Responsibilities of American Women, in
TREATISE ON DOMESTIc ECONOMY (1847) reprinted in ROOT OF BrrTERNEss, supra note 120,
at 171, 173.
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this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States. One of
these is, that a married woman is incapable, without her husband's
consent, of making contracts which shall be binding on her or
him 125hi .lz
The cult of domesticity, however, did help women obtain custody of
their children under the theory that children of tender years needed to
reside with their mothers, the natural caregivers. 126  In 1891 Martha
Strickland wrote Woman and the Forum, which illustrates that even though
women did often receive custody of children, property settlements were
still often influenced by separate sphere notions. Strickland stated it was
the "universal practice" for the judge to award the woman one third or less
of the estate, even if she had custody of the children. 127 Strickland argued
that this practice stemmed from the fact that all judges were men:
The judge is familiar with the wants of men in the business world;
he knows the need of the man for capital, and he reasons: "If I take
from him more than a third of his property he will be crippled, and
perhaps cannot keep his business standing,".... A woman would
know full well the difficulties to be met by a mother thus thrown
upon her resources, and would add the weight of her knowledge to
the decision.
128
The idea that men and women had certain roles to play, unaltered by
the dissolution of the marriage, is apparent. Even though divorced, there
was no expectation that the woman would enter the workforce because that
was the domain of men; therefore she did not need the capital. Underlying
this idea is the assumption that it would be worse to financially "cripple" a
man than to "cripple" a woman who had both a limited earning power and
the expense of her children. In addition, it created a bind for a woman in
that she could not stay within her proper sphere and provide for her
children. Strickland remarked on this inconsistency:
"Women should remain in the home; they have higher and holier
duties to perform than that of bread-winning," is cried from every
side; and then straightway, if their rightful protector fails in his
duty, instead of giving his substance to the woman so that she may
remain in the home and fill her "proper sphere," the court gives her
a paltry part, and she is left to perish in that home, or go out into
125. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
126. See Michael Grossberg, Who Gets The Child? Custody, Guardianship, and the Rise
of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth-Century America, in 3 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE
UNtrD STATES, DOMEsTIC RELATONS AND LAW 286, 299 (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992)
[hereinafter 3 DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND LAW].
127. See Martha Strickland, Woman And The Forum, 3 THE GREEN BAG 240, 241 (1891).
128. Id. at 241-242.
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the world and compete with man for daily bread. 129
2. Employment Opportunities for Women
While the reality of the nineteenth century was that the ideal created by
the cult of domesticity could not be fulfilled by all women, there was a
belief that all women could fulfill the ideal. This belief is apparent in the
concurrence written by Justice Bradley denying Myra Bradwell the right to
practice law. He wrote that "[m]an is, or should be, woman's protector and
defender."130 Justice Bradley barely acknowledged that some women did
not have husbands to support them and therefore needed the ability to enter
professions:
It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any
of the duties, complications, and incapacitates arising out of the
married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the
Creator. 131
Middle class women who needed to support themselves or their
families while maintaining their respectability found they had few readily
available choices: governess, teacher or author.132  Only a few
revolutionaries were pursuing careers in the traditionally male fields. 33
Most middle class married women were not working outside the domestic
sphere and would not have wanted to pursue a career outside of the
home. 134 As Nancy Cott points out in Root of Bitterness, "[w]omen's paid
work outside the home, though it was undertaken to support their families,
was a travesty of the domestic ideal of wife and mother."' 35 Women who
worked were predominately working class women and worked either as
servants or in factories. 36 Women also performed tasks such as taking in
sewing or boarders in order to provide income for their families.13 7 The
work that women did, though comparable to the work of men, was valued
less due to the assumption that a woman's earning function was secondary
to that of the man in her life, whether that be husband or father. 38 Many of
these positions, unlike professional positions, had no room for
129. Id. at 242.
130. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141. See also DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 21.
131. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
132. See HARRIS, supra note 26, at 60.
133. See id. at 117.
134. See Nancy Cott, Introduction to ROOT OFBITrERNESS, supra note 120, at 3, 21.
135. Id.
136. See id. at 12-13.
137. Clara Foltz took in sewing and boarders in Oregon. Babcock, Constitution-Maker,
supra note 22, at 860.
138. See Nancy Cott, Introduction to ROOT oFBnTERNSS, supra note 120, at 3,21-22.
advancement, again because there was the assumption that at some point
these women would cease working in order to become wives and
mothers. 1
39
3. Education
Another way society discouraged women from entering into
professional roles was by limiting their access to higher education, despite
the fact that higher education for women was rapidly expanding. 14° The
role that higher education should play in women's lives was a highly
debated question. 141 Opponents of higher education argued that if allowed
to pursue degrees, women would become masculinized and therefore
would fail to marry and have children, thus threatening the structure of
society. 142 Proponents of higher education, such as Lelia Robinson,
retorted, "it cannot be charged against her [female lawyers], any more than
it can against the college girl of the period, that she does not marry." 143
However, statistics indicate that the opponents were at least partly correct,
and that women with college educations were less likely to marry.'44
Part of the artillery of the opponents to higher education was the theory
put forth by Dr. Edward H. Clarke, in his book Sex in Education, or, A Fair
Chance for the Girls, published in 1873.145 Clarke provided a scientific
explanation for why women were physically unfit for higher education.146
Clarke theorized that the body was a closed-energy system, meaning that it
had a finite amount of energy; thus any energy spent studying wouid
reduce the energy available for reproduction. 147 Clarke also theorized that
if women studied too strenuously, they could permanently damage their
reproductive organs and become sterile.1 48 Clarke's recommendation was
that young women study one third less than their male counter-parts and
not study at all during menstruation. 49 Clarke wrote, "identical education
of the two sexes is a crime before God and humanity that physiology
protests against and that experience weeps over.' 150
Many women did not adhere to the theories of Clarke, or those of
139. See id. at 22.
140. See HARRIs, supra note 26, at 98.
141. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 38. In 1870, 41% of the colleges in the United
States admitted women and by 1890 63%. See id.
142. See ROSAuND ROSENBERG, BEYOND SEPARATE SPHERES 11 (1982).
143. Lelia J. Robinson, Women Lawyers In The United States, 2 THE GREEN BAG 10, 11
(1890).
144. See HARIs, supra note 26, at 101. Harris refers to the work of Mabel Newcomer
who estimates that over 50% of college women married, while another study indicates that
90-96% of the general population of women married. See id.
145. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 38.
146. See ROSENBERG, supra note 142, at 5.
147. See id. at 9-10.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 10.
150. Id. at 11-12.
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another doctor who wrote that "[w]oman is what she is [sic] ... in health,
in character... mind and soul because of her womb alone."'151 The
students attending the newly founded all women's colleges such as Vassar,
Smith and Wellesley 152 or the women attending coeducational schools
153
must not have believed that their womb was their only defining organ.
However, the fact that women were attending universities did not mean
those women totally disagreed with Clarke. One female educator wrote,
"We did not know when we began whether women's health could stand the
strain of education. We were haunted ... by the clanging of chains of that
gloomy specter, Dr. Edward Clarke's, Sex in Education."'54 For the most
part, proponents of women's education were not arguing that men and
women were the same, but were arguing that schooling would make
women better mothers and wives and give single women the ability to be
self-sufficient.
1 55
B. DISSENTING VOICES
The discourse about the role of women, like any other discourse, had
many voices. The predominant voice told women that they were limited to
the domestic sphere and that women should accept their destinies of wife
and mother. Some women refused to accept this destiny and broke with
tradition and social norms and ventured into the public sphere to see what
they could accomplish.
1. Suffrage
The loudest voices in opposition to the cult of domesticity came from
the women's suffrage movement. Women like Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Lucretia Mott and Susan B. Anthony were lobbying not only for the right
to vote, but also for the end to many of the disabilities under which women
labored. In 1848, Stanton and Mott organized the Seneca Falls
Convention.156 Out of the Convention came The Seneca Falls Declaration
of Sentiments, which catalogued the abuses that women had suffered at the
hands of men. The list included the inability to vote, the doctrine of
151. Dr. Horatio Storer, quoted in G. J. Barker-Benfield, The Spermatic Economy: A
Nineteenth-Century View of Sexuality, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIvE 383, (Michael Gordon ed., 2d ed. 1978), quoted in SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT,
SEX AND SUFFRAGE IN BRITAIN, 1860-1914,42 (1987).
152. See HARRIS, supra note 26, at 98-99.
153. See id. at 99. Many western states such as Wisconsin, Michigan, Missouri, Iowa,
Kansas, Indiana, Minnesota and California had coeducational state universities as early as
1870. See id.
154. ROSENBERG, supra note 142, at 12; DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 39.
155. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 38. This was by no means a new argument. Mary
Wollstonecraft argued this very thing in 1792 in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman. See
generally MARY WOLLSTONECRAFr, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN (1792),
reprinted in MARY WOLLSTONECRAFr: A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN; JOHN
STUART MILL: THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Mary Warnock ed., 1985).
156. See AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 264 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1991).
coverture, the inability to own property, the lack of opportunity to attend
college and the lack of opportunity to enter many professions; "as teacher
of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known."'157 In closing the
Convention, delegates called for the "immediate admission to all the rights
and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States."'
15
The suffrage movement was widespread and well publicized.19 Lelia
Robinson, in 1890, proposed that when determining the total number of
women lawyers, one should include women who had "temporarily or even
permanently abandoned the office and the court-room for the platform."
160
The "platform" refers to conventions like the Seneca Falls Convention and
the National Woman's Rights Convention, 16 at which women strategized
for the right to vote.
It is not surprising that many women who were lawyers were also
suffragettes. 162 As women lawyers, their livelihood depended on laws and
statutes that they could never directly change because they could not vote.
Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court revealed that the
courts were well aware of the suffrage movement when he said if statutes
containing the masculine pronoun were interpreted to include women, it
would "emasculate the constitution itself and include females in the
constitutional right of male suffrage.
1 63
2. Other Forms of Dissent
While progress on extending the franchise would have to wait until
1920,164 women did make significant headway on other fronts. The
enactment of the Married Women's Property Acts represented an important
change, especially for married women attempting to enter the legal
profession. Beginning around 1835, states began to alter the law that had
previously given husbands control over their wives' property upon
marriage.' 65 New York passed legislation in 1848 and 1849 that allowed
women to retain their real property acquired before marriage (and the
income derived from it) as their own separate property.166 Illinois and
157. The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments, reprinted in AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY
supra note 156, at 265, 265-66.
158. Id.
159. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 12. Clara Foltz was lobbying on the west coast and
women like Stanton and Anthony were from New York. See id.
160. Robinson, supra note 143, at 10.
161. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 13.
162. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 15. See also Mary L. Clark, The First Women
Members of the Supreme Court Bar, 1879-1900,36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 87, 120-126 (1999).
163. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 242 (1875).
164. The Nineteenth Amendment was passed August 26, 1920.
165. See Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married Women's Property Law:
Reception of the Early Married Women's Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, in 3
DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND LAW, supra note 126, at 312, 312.
166. See AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 156, at 266-68.
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Wisconsin followed suit, enacting legislation that allowed women to hold
property in their own names, to sue and be sued, and to enter into
contracts. 167 The impact of the Married Woman's Property Acts was
greater than women being able to retain their property and enter into
contracts. The Acts meant that the perception of women was slowly
changing during the later half of the nineteenth century.
161
Women also dissented through non-legal methods. Just as the cult of
domesticity was advocated through works of literature, so was the dissent.
"The Story of an Hour" by Kate Chopin is an example of this. 169 The story
begins when Mrs. Mallard learns that her husband has been killed. Mrs.
Mallard retreats to her room to grieve, but slowly realizes that once she
moves past the "bitter moment" there would be "a long procession of years
to come that would belong to her absolutely[ ] [a]nd she open[s] and
spread[s] her arms out to them in welcome., 170  Her family begs Mrs.
Mallard to open the door but she refuses, because she is "drinking in a very
elixir of life. ' 17 1 Mrs. Mallard then prays that life be long, even though the
day before she had abhorred such a thought. Eventually, Mrs. Mallard
leaves her room and "she carrie[s] herself unwittingly like a goddess of
Victory"172 as she begins to descend the stairs. Then she sees her husband
enter the home. Mrs. Mallard gives a "piercing cry," and "when the
doctors c[o]me they sa[y] she died of heart disease--of joy that kills.' 173
This story is far at the end of the spectrum of dissent, but it does show the
levels of discontent some women felt in their subordinated role.
3. Male Support
Women were not the only ones crusading for change. John Stuart Mill
tackled the issue in his 1869 treatise, The Subjection of Women. Mill
discarded the notion that women were naturally inferior, and asserted that
the plight of women was a result of their treatment, upbringing and
education. Mill argued that men wanted women to be willing slaves and
denied women access to education and the law in order to enslave their
minds. 174 The courts that denied Lavina Goodell and Myra Bradwell their
167. See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 23-67.
168. However, it should be noted that Married Woman's Property Acts were not just
passed because of a change in attitude toward women. The passage of some of the Acts was
in part because of the change from an agricultural to a commercial economy and the
development of more lenient debtor laws. See Norma Basch, Invisible Women: The Legal
Fiction of Marital Unity in Nineteenth-Century America, in 3 DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND
LAW, supra note 126 at 132, 135, 142.
169. Kate Chopin, "The Story of an Hour," (1894), reprinted in ROOT OF BrrERNESS,
supra note 120, at 363, 363.
170. Id. at 364-65.
171. Id. at 365.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS
right to enter the legal profession occupied one end of the male spectrum,
but Mill argued from the other when he wrote:
the principle which regulates the existing social relations between
the two sexes-the legal subordination of one sex to the other-is
wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human
improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a principle of
perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side,
nor disability on the other.1
75
Educators like Matthew Vassar helped women when he founded
Vassar College, remarking "woman, having received from her creator the
same intellectual constitution as man, has the same right as man to
intellectual and cultural development.' '176 Male legislators, such as the
legislators that introduced Foltz's, Woman's Lawyer Bill, helped women
by passing legislation that created educational and professional
opportunities. 177 Less known men also supported the women's movement.
In an 1890 article surveying female lawyers, over half reported themselves
married. 178 Often these women studied in the offices of their husbands or
fathers before seeking admission to the bar, or worked in their husbands'
offices after passing the bar. 179 Carrie Burnham Kilgore, for example, was
aided by her husband in her pursuit of a legal career. Kilgore attended the
University of Pennsylvania in 1881180 and her husband escorted her to the
opening lecture.I18
C. THE LAW'S REACTION TO WOMEN LAWYERS
1. Law Schools
When Clara Foltz and her contemporaries contemplated the law as a
career they had two options: study law in a private firm before taking the
bar or attend law school. For those who chose to attend law school, it was
often a difficult endeavor. Unlike most female medical students, who
entered all-women's schools, 8 2 female law students entered co-educational
117, 132 (Stefan Collini ed., 1991).
175. Id. at 119.
176. HARRIS, supra note 26, at 99.
177. See supra text accompanying note 71. See also DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 12.
178. See Robinson, supra note 143.
179. See id. Mrs. Myra Bradwell studied under husband and her daughter Miss Bessie
Bradwell was also a lawyer. See id. at 14. Mrs. Ada H. Kepley studied in her husband's
office before attending law school. See id. Mrs. Catharine V. Waite studied with her
husband who was a judge. See id. Mrs. Le Valley worked in her husband's office. See id.
at 18. Miss Almeda E. Hitchcock was encouraged to attend law school by her father who
was a judge. See id. at 19.
180. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 49.
181. See id.
182. See id. at 40.
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schools. There were no separate schools for women until the end of the
nineteenth century. 183 The establishment of female medical schools may
have been easier because women could use separate sphere ideology in
order to justify women entering the medical field. They argued that women
were "natural" caregivers, and that therefore women should be doctors and
nurses.
184
Many law schools were hostile to the admittance of women. In 1890,
Harvard, Yale and Columbia were refusing to admit women.185 After Alice
R. Jordan attended Yale in 1885 and graduated, 186 Yale changed its
catalogue to state that the courses were only open to men, unless it
specifically stated that women could attend. This was to "to prevent a
repetition of the Jordan incident."' 87 Yale was not the only school to be
openly hostile to female students. George Templeton Strong, a trustee at
Columbia, wrote in his diary after three women applied to the law school,
"No woman shall degrade herself by practicing law, in N.Y. especially, if I
can save her... . 'Womens' Rights-women' are uncommonly loud &
offensive of late. I loath the lot."'
188
However, not all law schools refused to admit women. In 1890 Lelia
Robinson listed several law schools that admitted women: Union Law
College (Chicago), Michigan University, University of Wisconsin,
Bloomington Law School (Illinois), Chicago Law School, State University
of Iowa, Hastings College of the Law, Howard University,'89 University of
Pennsylvania and Boston University. 19° Women generally fared better in
the West than in the East.19' For example, when Lemma Barkaloo was
denied admittance to Columbia because of her gender, she turned west and
attended the law school at Washington University, in St. Louis, which was
always open to women.192 Women also fared better in the West because
Western states were more likely to have legislation that allowed women to
practice the law.
193
2. The Ideas of Dr. Clarke at the Law Schools
Law schools and the bar used the ideas of Dr. Clarke to argue that
183. See id. at41.
184. See Lind, supra note 118, at 1355.
185. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 12.
186. See id. at 12-13.
187. See id. at 13.
188. THE DIARY OF GEORGE TEMPLETON STRONG: POST-WAR YEARS, 1865-1875 (Allan
Nevins & Milton Halsey Thomas eds., 1952), quoted in DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 41.
189. Mrs. Charlotte E. Ray, the first women admitted to Howard, applied and was
accepted as C.E. Ray. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 28.
190. See generally Robinson, supra note 143.
191. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 13. DRACEMAN, supra note 63, at 41, 46-47.
192. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 13.
193. DRAcHMAN, supra note 63, 251 tbl.1. Between 1870-1899, eleven western states, but
only six eastern states had statutes allowing women to practice the law. See id.
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women were physically fragile and could not withstand the rigors of law
school or legal practice; therefore they should be denied admittance.
9 4
When Lemma Barkaloo died in 1870 of typhoid fever, it was argued that
her death was from the strain of being a lawyer.1 5 When Lavina Goodell
died at age forty-one in 1880, the Chicago Journal questioned whether her
early death was related to the rigors of the legal profession.
196
Six years after Goodell's death, Charles Moore wrote a story entitled
The Woman Lawyer.197  The protagonist, Miss Padelford, develops a
litigation practice, and as it grows her health suffers. When Miss Padelford
faces an "odious pest" of a lawyer and an intoxicated judge, she passes out
and is declared seriously ill with brain fever. After she recovers, she
announces that she is leaving town and would no longer litigate on her
physician's advice. Walter Perry, a young male lawyer in town with a
large and lucrative practice, comes to Padelford's rescue, as she is about to
leave. Perry proposes and Padelford works in his office, protected from the
strains of litigation by her husband.19
Some women even argued that their nature, that is, their reproductive
organs, made them unsuitable for litigation. 199 Of course, not every woman
found legal practice physically straining. Lettlie Burlingame wrote to Lelia
Robinson that her friends were very concerned when she began practicing
the law because of her "weak constitution." It turned out the law agreed
with her and she enjoyed the best health she had ever had when
200practicing.
3. Courts
Women lawyers faced the possibility of hostility in any avenue to the
law. The courts were no different than the law schools. Two of the most
famous cases in which women faced hostility from the courts were
.194. See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 38.
195. See id.
196. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 24. Robinson quoted the Independent as saying,
"One swallow does not make a summer." Id.
197. Charles C. Moore, The Women Lawyer, 26 THE GREEN BAG 525 (1914). This piece
was originally written in 1886 for the Hartford Daily Times. See id. at 525.
198. See id. at 526-31.
199. See Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers And The Quest For Professional Identify
In Late Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2414, 2439 [hereinafter Drachman,
Women Lawyers]. Ellen Martin wrote, "I refer to the close relation between the brain and
the organs peculiar to women and to the fact that any trouble with those organs (and a
celebrated anatomist says they seem made to get out of order) seriously affects the brain and
the nervous system." Martin urged women not to litigate because it was more strenuous
than office work. "The peculiarity I have mentioned makes women liable to suffer more
from this nervous strain than men." Letter from Ellen Martin to the Equity Club (May 25,
1888) (reproduced in The Equity Club Annual, 1888, at 34-35) (available in the Dillon
collection), quoted in Drachman, Women Lawyers, supra.
200. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 17.
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Bradwell v. Illinois2 1 and In re Goodell.202 Bradwell argued that under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, no state could
deny participation in a profession such as the law, based on sex, because
the right to practice law was a right every United States citizen
possessed.2 3 The Court relied on the Slaughterhouse Cases2°4 and ruled
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause did protect some rights, which
the states could not abridge, but that those rights did not include the right to
practice law.205 The concurrence also denied Bradwell on the ground that
married women could not enter into binding contracts.2°6
Justice Bradley's concurrence displays the paternalism that women like
Bradwel faced as they attempted to enter the profession. Bradley's
comments reveal that some courts believed in the notion of separate
spheres and felt that they were protecting women by denying them
admission to the bar. Women were fit for some occupations, but the law
was not one of them. Bradley wrote:
The humane movements of modem society, which have for their
object the multiplication of avenues for woman's advancement,
and of occupations adapted to her condition and sex, have my
heartiest concurrence. But I am not prepared to say that it is one of
her fundamental rights and privileges to be admitted into every
office and position... in view of the peculiar characteristics,
destiny and mission of woman, it is with the province of the
legislature to ordain what offices ... shall be filled and discharged
by men, and shall receive the benefit of those energies and
responsibilities, and that decision and firmness which are presumed
to predominate in the sterner sex.2°7
Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, when deciding
Goodell, was even more hostile than Justice Bradley. Ryan, like Bradley,
wrote that it was the destiny of women to be mothers and that "the peculiar
qualities of womanhood" made women unfit for careers in the law.208 Ryan
was concerned that allowing women to be lawyers would tempt them from
201. 83 U.S. 130.
202. 39 Wis. 232. Goodell was later admitted after the Wisconsin legislature passed a law
allowing women to be admitted to the bar. The court upheld Goodell's right to admission
and Chief Justice Ryan dissented apparently still unhappy that women were being admitted
to the bar. In re Goodell, 81 N.W. 551.
203. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 133-37.
204. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). The privileges and immunities clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment did not guarantee the right to a engage in a specific profession. Therefore the
state could regulate professional choices. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139.
205. See Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 139.
206. See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
207. Id. at 142 (Bradley, J., concurring).
208. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 245 (Ryan, C.J., concurring).
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"the proper duties of their sex." 2°9 Ryan also wanted to protect women
from what they would see in a law practice because of the "high reverence"
210that was felt toward women. Women were so revered in their roles as
mothers and wives that:
It would be revolting to all female sense of the innocence and
sanctity of their sex ... that woman should be permitted to mix
professionally in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way
into courts of justice; all the unclean issues, all the collateral
questions of sodomy, incest, rape, seduction, fornication, adultery,
pregnancy, bastardy, legitimacy, prostitution, lascivious
cohabitation, abortion, infanticide, obscene publications, libel and
211
slander of sex, impotence, divorce ....
It is interesting that Ryan felt he was protecting women like Lavina
Goodell from the unclean issues of the world, yet the very issues that he did
not want women to see all involved women. It appears that Goodell and
Bradwell understood this, as did other women like Martha Strickland.2 2
Goodell and Bradwell argued that justice required "the silver voice" 213 and
the "peculiar delicacy, refinement, and conscientiousness" 214 of women in
order for there to be true justice. The courts argued that because men and
women were so different, women had to be excluded. Women argued that
because men and women were so different female litigants could never find
justice because male lawyers and judges could never truly understand a
woman's situation, justice required the admission of women.
Not all women were unsuccessful in their attempts to have courts
recognize their rights to be lawyers. The first woman to gain admission to
the bar was Belle Mansfield. She was admitted under an Iowa statute that
allowed any white man to be an attorney. The judge read the statute in
connection with another section of the statute that said that masculine
pronouns referred to both men and women.215 Other courts had to admit
women because the legislatures in their states had passed statutes expressly
216
allowing women to be lawyers. Congress passed a bill that allowed
women to be admitted to argue before the Supreme Court in 1879.217 Even
with these favorable decisions it was still hard for that first woman to go
209. Id.
210. Id. at 246.
211. Seeid. at 245-46.
212. See Strickland, supra note 127, at 241.
213. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 137.
214. In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 237.
215. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 21. This argument was used unsuccessfully by
Goodell. See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. at 241.
216. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 30. Wisconsin, California and Massachusetts all
had statutes that explicitly allowed women to be lawyers. See id.
217. See id. at 27; DRAcHMAN, supra note 63, at 27.
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before the court and seek admission. Mary Hall, of Connecticut, thought of
going to another state to gain admission because she was "dreading the
noise and criticism to which a pioneer in such a matter is always
subjected., 218
4. Society
A woman who endured law school or found a private office to study in,
and then was actually able to gain admittance to the bar, still faced one
more obstacle: society. Some women faced little prejudice. For example,
Carrie Kilgore took over her husband's practice after his death and all but
one of the clients remained.219 Addie Billings practiced with her husband
and only occasionally encountered a man who did not want a woman to
handle the case.220 Clara Foltz, Laura deForce Gordon, Belva Lockwood,
Catherine McCulloch, Marilla Ricker are some examples of women who
also had successful legal careers.221
Other women faced opposition from their husbands. Hamilton
Douglass wrote to Lelia Robinson that even though his wife, Corinne
Douglas, had attended Michigan Law School with him and had passed the
Michigan bar, it was never intended for her to practice. She attended law
222
school so she could support her husband in his endeavor to practice law.
Corinne Douglass' obstacles were compounded by the fact that after
graduation the family moved to Georgia, which did not allow women to
practice the law, and because her husband stated, "[S]he finds her hands
full in the 'Domestic Relations,' so to speak, in taking care of her boy and
other duties."
223
A Hastings graduate with a similar story was Mary McHenry.
McHenry was the daughter of a New Orleans judge and the first woman to
graduate from Hastings, in 1882.224 McHenry was even one of the five
student speakers at her commencement.225 After practicing for seven or
eight months McHenry married, becoming Mrs. Mary McHenry Keith.
After her marriage, Keith retired from the law and traveled with her
husband for two years, but wanted at some point to resume her practice.226
Keith wrote to Lelia Robinson "her husband laughingly [said], 'Not much
you will.' 2 27 Her husband was right; Keith never did resume practice.
218. Robinson, supra note 143, at 29. Hall in the end did decide to seek admission in
Connecticut and was admitted in 1882. See id.
219. See id. at 28-29.
220. See id. at 25.
221. See Clark, supra note 162, at 117-18. See generally Robinson, supra 143.
222. See Robinson, supra note 143, at 19.
223. Id. at 19. Though one might question why if Corinne was never going to practice she
went through the effort of seeking admission to the Michigan bar.
224. See id. at 25-26; BARNES, supra note 8, at 49.
225. See BARNES, supra note 8, at 58.
226. See id. at 59-61.
227. Robinson, supra note 143, at 26.
However, Keith was an active suffragette and was close friends with Susan
B. Anthony.228
It would be presumptuous to say that Keith's and Douglass' husbands
forbade them from practicing law.229 However, it may have been that
without their husbands' support, they could not overcome society's notions,
as well as their own, of what a woman was supposed to be, and so never
entered the male sphere to practice. It was not easy for any woman to
overcome societal norms which stated that "the constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance... indicates the
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and
functions of womanhood. 230
Modem readers should not underestimate the power of the cult of
domesticity. The ideas could be found in a variety of sources, such as
fiction and nonfiction literature, which defined what women were and told
them how to fit into that definition.2 31 The ideas pervaded practically every
aspect of the lives of women in the nineteenth century. Most Victorians
accepted to varying degrees the notions that the home was the sphere of
women (though not necessarily her only sphere) and that the role of wife
and mother was the role divinely ordained for women.
IV. THE STRUGGLE TO BE CLARA SHORTRIDGE FOLTZ
As Section III illustrates, women entering the field of the law were
bound to confront someone who would challenge their right to be in the
male sphere by using separate sphere ideology. Foltz was no different, and
from the moment she tried to enter the legal field she encountered people
who told her that her proper sphere was the home and she had no right to
enter the male sphere. Her response to this was that women should be
released from their sphere and be allowed to participate in professions.
However, this was not Foltz's only response. She also used the language of
separate sphere ideology to create the persona of the "lady lawyer." It was
a persona that appealed to many and was less threatening-while she was a
lawyer, she was still a "lady." As long as Foltz wore the label "lady," it
meant that her actions were confined by the label. However, Foltz also
reacted to situations in ways that reveal her acceptance and embrace of
separate sphere ideology.
When Foltz first tried to enter the male sphere, by attempting to study
228. See BARNES, supra note 8, at 60-61.
229. However, Virginia Drachman argues that Keith's career ended because her husband
was "unsupportive." See DRACHMAN, supra note 63, at 107. Although, Drachman does not
indicate why she believes that Keith's husband ended her career and seems to dismiss the
possibility that Keith voluntarily chose not to practice, instead devoting her efforts to the
suffrage movement. See id.
230. Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141.
231. See HARRIS, supra note 26, at 56.
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with Francis Spencer she should not have been surprised, regardless of
what she wrote in Struggles, when her attempts were denied, especially
considering that when she tried to study with Spencer there were no female
lawyers in California. 232 However, it is clear that irrespective of society's
views Foltz believed that she had every right to study with Spencer. 33
Spencer did not share this same belief and wrote in response to her request
to study at his offices:
My high regard for... you, who seem to have no right
understanding of what you say you want to undertake, forbid
encouraging you in so foolish a pursuit-wherein you would invite
nothing but ridicule if not contempt. A woman's place is at home,
unless it is as a teacher.2 4
In response to this type of thinking, Foltz asked, "must [woman]
necessarily be confined forever within its four walls and refuse to qualify
for useful service in any... profession?" 235 Her statement reveals that
Foltz felt she was not just barred from the law, but from "useful service in
any... profession.23 6 While there were other "professions" Foltz could
have pursued, such as teaching or writing, she recognized that her
opportunities were very limited because she was a woman. She was barred
by custom, if not by law, from becoming a banker, an engineer or any of
the occupations within the male sphere. Foltz's comment also reveals she
was not content to be "confined." She wanted to be "useful" and was
willing to question the premises of separate sphere ideology in order to
pursue a profession in which she could provide "useful service." Foltz was
willing to directly challenge the notions of separate sphere ideology.
Spencer used separate sphere ideology to claim that a woman's place
was in the home, but he was not the only one to challenge Foltz with this
ideology. When she lobbied for the passage of the Woman's Lawyers Bill,
"[h]ome and mother and prattling babes ... and women's sphere.., were
dished up and handed forth as the highest wisdom. ''237. Her response to the
separate sphere argument was clearly angry. She did at that moment have
an "overarching sense of mission"238-to gain the right to be a lawyer. Her
anger at being told she should be barred from the legal profession, based
solely on men's notions of separate sphere, was evident even in 1916,
thirty-seven years later after The Women's Lawyer Bill when she wrote:
"think of it! They made laws against vagrancy, they urged laws against
232. See id. Aug. 1916, at 11.
233. She claimed that she honestly felt that Judge Spencer would accept her as a student.
See Struggles, supra note 2, June 1916, at 5.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. Aug. 1916, at 11.
238. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 139.
tramps, they complained loudly of prevalent idleness-and yet, I had to
beg-not for a living, but to be allowed to earn a living-had to beg it as a
privilege .... ,,239
Foltz's confrontations with separate sphere ideology continued after
she gained the right to practice. She was told that she would never get
clients because women could not keep secrets.24° She had an opposing
counsel, a "learned limb of the law" as Foltz called him, "bellow" to the
jury, " '[s]he IS A WOMN... she cannot be expected to reason: God
Almighty decreed her limitations, but you can reason, and you must use
your reasoning faculties against this young woman... ,,,241 Another
opposing counsel "suggested to her in open court that she had better be at
home raising her children." 242
Her rebellion against separate sphere ideology is evident in her
response to the suggestion she stay at home: "a woman had better be in
almost any business than raising such men as you,"243 and in her closing
argument to the "learned limb of the law." Foltz argued that it was bad
lawyering for opposing counsel to argue separate sphere ideology instead
of the law. Her impatience at confronting separate sphere ideology is clear:
I ask no special privileges and expect no favors, but I think it only
fair that those who have had better opportunities than I, who have
had fewer obstacles to surmount and fewer difficulties to contend
with should meet me on even ground, upon the merits of law and
fact without this everlasting and incessant reference to sex-
reference that in its very nature is uncalled for and which is as
unprofessional as it is unmanly.244
When Foltz recounts the incident in her column Struggles and
Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer, she refers to the following part of her
closing where she openly mocked opposing counsel for basing his closing
on the fact that she was a woman:
Counsel opened his argument with the astounding revelation that I
am a woman. It was a wonderful announcement-fit epigram for a
god to have spoken. Any yet, after this magnificent burst of
blazing genius the sun does not appear to be darkened nor the
moon paled by the contrast .... I wonder that the planets did not
stand still in their courses and rivers cease to run to the sea at the
announcement of this startling discovery. I am amazed that his
239. Struggles, supra note 2, Aug. 1916, at 11.
240. See id. Oct. 1916, at 11.
241. Id. Jan. 1918, at 10.
242. BENCH AND BAR, supra note 7, at 832.
243. Id.
244. LEF r AL., LADIEs AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY 220 (1998) (quoting Foltz in 1890)
(emphasis added).
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Honor did not faint upon the bench and that you gentlemen of the
jury have survived this awful shock to your nervous systems...
[h]e should break the news gently and not plunge such an original
thought upon an unprepared jury... how he heedlessly enlightens
an unprepared jury on such a vital topic.245
Foltz was angry that her sex was in issue. Both she and opposing
counsel knew that the all male jury was likely to believe that her proper
place was at home and how that could prejudice her client. Thus, it was not
only the separate sphere beliefs of male lawyers that she had to confront,
she also had to recognize that members of the juries before which she
argued were likely to believe that a woman should be confined to the home.
Again, it is important to remember that separate sphere ideology was the
dominant theory of the day. Most men thought women were inferior and
Foltz had to counter this notion time and time again. Her response was
partly because she was angry that opposing counsel made her sex an issue,
and partly to show the jury that she could reason, that it was opposing
counsel who was the intellectual inferior.
Foltz, in her closing, not only expressed her anger at not being treated
as an equal member of the bar, but also expressed anger at the other ways
in which separate sphere ideology limited her but not opposing counsel:
I am that formidable and terrifying object known as a woman-
while he is only a poor, helpless, defenseless man, and he wants
you to take pity on him and give him a verdict in this case. I
sympathize with counsel in his unhappy condition. True, the world
is open to him. He is the peer of all men-he can aspire to the
highest offices, he can carry a torch over our streets during a
political campaign and sell his vote for a dollar and a half on
election day, and yet he isn't satisfied.246
Foltz did not need to argue before the jury the differences that men and
women faced in Victorian culture. She could have limited her argument to
the fact that opposing counsel was arguing the obvious before the jury
when he exclaimed she was a woman. When she expanded her argument
to include suffrage she was squarely rejecting separate sphere ideology and
the limitations it tried to place on her and every women.
Foltz confronted separate sphere ideology in places other than the
courtroom. When she wrote about trying to attend law school, she recalled
watching as "the [male] students hurried up the steps arm in arm, their
faces aglow with enthusiasm-all the world opened its arms to them, law
schools and colleges were built and endowed for men." 247 The world, and
245. Struggles, supra note 2, Jan. 1918, at 11.
246. LIEF, supra note 244, at 218-19.
247. Struggles, supra note 2, July 1917, at 19.
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Hastings in particular, did not open its arms to women, and in order to be a
part of that world Foltz had to challenge the separate sphere ideology that
so desperately wanted to keep her confined to the four walls of her home.
She was told by a janitor at Hastings that his "orders were that I was to be
kept out because of being a woman."248 She was also told by one of the
professors, regarding the matter of her admittance, "You have no rights in
the matter at all. If we have a mind to let you come you can, but you have
no right to."249 By suing the school, she openly and publicly rejected the
separate sphere beliefs held by the directors of the school.
In order to understand why Foltz was still having to confront separate
sphere ideology despite the legislature's passage of the Women's Lawyer
Bill, it is important to remember that separate sphere ideology was a deeply
rooted social theory and it was a belief about how the sexes should interact.
As a belief, it did not disappear with a statement by a legislature that a
certain area was no longer to be closed to women. The passage of the
Woman's Lawyer Bill was a message by the California legislature that it
was not going to accept all the tenets of separate sphere ideology and was
going to allow women to enter into the realm of the law, even though that
was a traditionally male realm. The message did not erase the beliefs held
by the Board of Directors at Hastings or, for that fact, many other men.
This is why Foltz continued to have to battle in order to escape her sphere.
Even after Foltz sued Hastings for admittance and the court declared
that Hastings could not refuse to admit women because of their sex, she
still had to deal with separate sphere notions. When Judge Hastings was
asked, "what [would] the Directors... do about the admission of Mrs.
Foltz and Mrs. Gordon among a lot of innocent law students who had never
seen a woman,"5 0 the San Francisco Chronicle rather cheekily reported:
[S]ome separation of the sexes in the lecture-room was imperative.
The friction of studious silk with contemplative broadcloth was not
to be thought of. It was a wild imagining. He had not yet decided
what form of feminine isolation would be best. The legal carpenter
might be instructed to erect a gilt-edged and golden-railed balcony,
a gallery with gilt and pearl-inlaid lattice in the style of Turkish
harems, a pagoda with minarets, or a simply Oregon-pine platform
in one comer, with plush furniture, sheet-iron door, and the legend,
"All hope (of marriage) abandon ye who enter here." The general
conception was easy to an imaginative mind, but the details
required a judicial intellect.251
It is unlikely that Judge Hastings imagined a "Turkish harem" for his
248. Id. at 18.
249. Woman at the Bar, supra note 3.
250. The Lady Lawyer, supra note 2.
251. Id.
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female students, but the statement still reflects his belief that men and
women should not undertake professional activities together. This belief
stemmed from separate sphere ideology, which depicted men as aggressive
and better suited to engage in things like commercial activities, whereas,
women were pure and emotional, thus better suited to engage in the duties
associated with the home. The fact that the court required Hastings to
admit Foltz did not eradicate Judge Hastings' beliefs on what was proper,
and hence he wanted to maintain the separateness that separate sphere
ideology dictated should exist. Winning the legal battle to attend Hastings
was only part of Foltz's challenge; she still had to fight for acceptance, or
even mere tolerance, of a woman in the man's sphere.
As the above examples illustrate, Foltz continually had to confront the
notions of separate sphere ideology. Her response in the above examples
was a refusal to adhere to the tenets of separate sphere ideology. She
refused to be told that her place was in the home and that she could not
argue and reason like a man. She refused to be limited to her sphere, and
attacked these notions in the legislature, in the courtroom and in her
practice.252 She paid a price for her rebellion; "there was always a social
thread of disapproval which tangled and restricted my success."3 She also
paid a tremendous emotional price for confronting separate sphere
ideology. She said that after the "learned limb of the law" made his
observation that Foltz was a woman, "I felt as though my clothes had all
slipped off of me and that I stood there nude before the Court and the jury.
It seemed to me that the only criminal at the bar was myself-guilty of the
crime of being a woman."
254
If these were the only statements and tales we had, we might be
justified in arguing that Foltz was an ardent feminist who had not
internalized the notions of the cult of domesticity, and who believed that
the best way to change society's views on women was to openly reject the
tenets of separate sphere ideology. But there are other reminisces and
comments that reveal she is infinitely more complex.
At times Foltz openly rejected the idea of separate spheres, but it must
also be recognized that when convenient to her cause she would play the
role of the "lady lawyer," as the newspapers dubbed her.255 Of course, to
be able to claim the title "lady" meant she had to in some ways, at least
outwardly, embrace society's notions of what it meant to be a lady; she
could not always be in direct rebellion with separate sphere ideology. Foltz
252. Foltz had a client that wanted Foltz to be co-counsel with a Mr. Thompson. Upon
hearing this, Mr. Thompson told Foltz, "he had no objections to me as a lady, 'but I will not
associate with any woman at the bar; I will leave the case first. ... '" Struggles, supra note
2, Sept. 1917, at 15.
253. Id. Oct. 1916, at 11.
254. Id.
255. See, e.g., Woman's Rights, supra note 2; Aspiring Lady Lawyers, supra note 2; The
Lady Lawyer, supra note 2; The Lady Lawyers, supra note 2.
recognized this when she reflected upon the newspapers calling her "lady
lawyer:"
[T]hey called me the "lady lawyer," a pretty sobriquet which did
much for me, for of course to be worthy of so dainty a title I was
bound to maintain a dainty manner as I browbeat my way through
the marshes of ignorance and prejudice which beset me on every
hand.2 6
The woman who accepted the label "lady lawyer" was not the same
woman who stated that opposing counsel should "meet me on even ground,
upon the merits of law and fact without this everlasting and incessant
reference to sex.''257 If Foltz had truly wanted an end to the "incessant
reference to sex," she would have objected to the term "lady lawyer," as
did many of her contemporaries such as Lelia Robinson, who said "Don't
be 'lady lawyers,' [s]imply be lawyers and recognize no distinction...
between yourselves and the other member of the bar."258
When she allowed herself to be described as the "lady lawyer" she was
arguably, as Babcock argues, acting like a lawyer in the sense that
"[piracticing lawyers... mainly deal with persuasion-what will sell, and
with the possible-what will work."259 Foltz knew what would "sell."
Arguing that she was no different from men, and being aggressive, was not
what would "sell" to the majority of Victorians. Foltz saw the benefit in
being perceived as "dainty" as she "browbeat" her way into the legal
profession. So, when Thomas Barnes refers to her as the "antithesis of
everything that Victorian convention believed a gentlewoman should
be,"260 this statement cannot be entirely accurate, for she at least outwardly
embraced some Victorian notions so that she could be called the "lady
lawyer."
There are many examples of Foltz as the "lady lawyer" in the press.
This flattering portrayal helped Foltz create the persona of the "lady
lawyer." Foltz presented herself in such a way that the press and the public
would perceive her as an ordinary mother and widow who happened to
practice law and not a woman rebelling against separate sphere ideology.261
For example, a San Francisco Chronicle reporter wrote about Foltz, "There
is nothing indicative of the typical strong-minded woman about her. Her
bearing is that of a brave, cheerful, enthusiastic little woman, modest,
dignified and self-reliant., 262 This description is in an article discussing
256. Struggles, supra note 2, Oct. 1916, at 11.
257. LF, supra note 244, at 220 (emphasis added).
258. Letter from Lelia J. Robinson to the Equity Club (Apr. 9, 1887) (available in the
Dillon Collection), quoted in Drachman, Women Lawyers, supra note 199, at 2429.
259. Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1285.
260. BARNES, supra note 8, at 47.
261. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 139 n.31.
262. Woman at the Bar, supra note 3.
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Foltz's litigation against Hastings. The litigation was clearly an act by a
strong-minded woman, yet the reporter focuses on Foltz's feminine
qualities creating the image of a "lady lawyer."
Not only was the press fascinated by Foltz's character, but they were
also fascinated by what she wore, which also helped to perpetuate the
image of the "lady lawyer." A reporter, upon meeting Foltz in her office,
described her as "a bright, fair-haired, rosy-featured, cheerful, matronly
woman, neatly attired in a dress of dark material, over which was worn a
most non-judicial checkered apron." 263  Another very short article,
reporting that the court had agreed to postpone Foltz and Gordon's suit
against Hastings at the request of an "aged masculine attorney," described
the hair of the lady lawyers: "Mrs. Foltz, with yellow hair, crimped and
plaited, and Mrs. Laura de Force Gordon, with dark brown hair, in Coke-
upon-Lyttleton curls down her back .... ,2 4 The New York Times stated,
"[h]er costumes are fashionable and without a trace of mannish
affectation. 265 Another article described Foltz as:
genteelly attired in a business suit of black silk, trimmed with
velvet. A scarf or band of black lace was passed around the neck
and crossed in front, over which peeped a standing collar of white
linen of the Piccadilly pattern. Her wrists were ornamented with
fringes of black silk, partially concealing hands not lacking in bone
and muscle, and with bands of black velvet fastened with golden
butterflies. At her throat was a modest gold brooch. Her profuse
hair was done in braids, which fell backward from the crown of her
266head like an Alpine glacier lit by a setting sun.
The use of the words "modest" and lacking "mannish affection" to
describe Foltz helped build her image of a respectable woman who
happened to practice the law. But it was not just what Foltz wore that
perpetuated the image of the "lady lawyer," it was also what she said. In
one of her lectures, Foltz said, "knowledge of the law would enable women
to be ... better wives and better mothers." 267 Her statement implied that
women should not study the law for their own gratification, but in order to
help men by being better wives and mothers. This is not the outright
rebellion that was seen earlier, but a more modest request for the expansion
of the woman's sphere in order to better society. Her columns in Struggles
contain phrases such as "it was the desire that women should be as they
263. Id.
264. The Lady Lawyers, supra note 2.
265. N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1896, quoted in Babcock, First Woman, supra note 4, at 1275
n.187.
266. Woman's Rights, supra note 2.
267. Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 866.
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ought to be, the helpmeets of men," 268 "[a] woman's place is at home"269
and "I was and am a worshipper of home and all that pertains to that
institution." 270 Again, these are not statements of outright rebellion against
separate sphere ideology, but are either statements by a woman who was a
pragmatist, and therefore made statements she felt would be accepted by
her culture, or are statements by a woman who wanted to expand her
sphere without abandoning it.
Babcock argues that Foltz used these phrases to "smooth the
boldness" 271 of her ideas, and that "Foltz cloaked her force and ambition
beneath graceful and disarming gestures." 272 Babcock is not the only writer
to interpret Foltz's actions in this way. Carolyn Heilbrun and Judith
Resnik, in Convergences: Law, Literature and Feminism, state, "Clara
Foltz needed to cushion the meaning of her breakthrough as a lawyer."
273
If one believes that Foltz totally rejected the tenets of separate sphere
ideology, these statements must be true, because as noted before Foltz did
not object to the label the "lady lawyer" or to how the press described her.
She could have refused interviews with members of the press who called
her the "lady lawyer." She could have told the press, especially in later
articles, only about her struggles and feats as a lawyer, rather than also
telling them about her children and her widowhood. 274
The problem with the statements by Babcock, Heilbrun and Resnik is
that they imply that Foltz made these comments solely to perpetuate the
image of the "lady lawyer." They do not address the idea that Foltz might
have believed that women should be lady lawyers, and that not all of the
tenets of separate sphere ideology should be abandoned. They fail to
recognize the power of the cult of domesticity. As the writings of Virginia
Woolf indicate, the image of woman as Angel was very powerful, and even
first women were affected by this image. Just as Woolf struggled with her
own internalizations of the cult of domesticity, so did Foltz. This is not to
say that Foltz did not also reject separate sphere ideology and believe that
men and women should be treated as equals. When she made statements
like "all the world opened its arms to them" when referring to male
students entering Hastings, she appears to resent the fact that all the world
was not open to her.275 Foltz is like Woolf, at times dispatching the Angel
and at other times having the Angel "creep" back into her thinking.
Foltz's comments surrounding her divorce and her reactions to divorce
reveal the presence of the Angel in Foltz's life. Foltz divorced her husband
268. Struggles, supra note 2, Aug. 1916, at 11.
269. Id. June 1916, at5.
270. Id. Apr. 1916, at 10.
271. Babcock, Constitution-Maker, supra note 22, at 866.
272. Id. at 867.
273. 99 YALE L.J. 1913, 1917 (1990).
274. Theodore Dreiser, The Career of a Modem Portia, SuccEss, Jan. 1899, at 205.
275. Struggles, supra note 2, July 1917, at 19.
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in 1879, but started referring to herself as a widow in 1878.276 The
question that Barbara Babcock strives to answer in her article
Reconstructing the Person: The Case of Clara Shortridge Foltz is why
Foltz began describing herself this way.2 7 Babcock states, "It is not
surprising that Clara Foltz decided, as her career rose and her marriage
declined, to present herself as a widow.' 278  Babcock argues that when
Foltz told reporters "the accident of her early dependency was brought
about by death,"279 or declared that her struggles were to "enable [women]
in some degree to protect themselves and their children when the shadow
of death had fallen upon the head of the household," 280 Foltz was
employing a strategy to further Foltz's career. Foltz was cloaking her
divorce in terms of widowhood because Foltz thought it would "sell" to her
contemporaries and would prevent her critics from arguing that women in
the legal profession would bring about the demise of marriages.2 81
Babcock does acknowledge in a footnote that Foltz may have lied
because she did not like the image of a deserted wife for social status
reasons, "although divorce was not as socially unacceptable in the West as
elsewhere in the country.' 282 Divorce statistics reveal that in 1880, one in
every twenty-one marriages ended in divorce, and by 1900, it was one in
twelve.2 3  Norma Basch, in Framing American Divorce, argues that
women who had the option to seek a divorce "displayed a remarkable
propensity to use it.''284 She also argues "wives who had themselves been
cast off by their husbands received an unilateral and essentially
sympathetic hearing in court."
28 5
Babcock does not really consider the theory that Foltz portrayed herself
as a widow in part because Foltz believed in separate sphere ideology, and
believed that she had failed to fulfill what those notions dictated a wife
should be.286 Certainly being a widow allowed her to argue that becoming
a lawyer was something she did out of necessity and that allowing women
276. See Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 132.
277. See generally Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12.
278. Id. at 136.
279. Dreiser, supra note 274, at 205.
280. Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 132.
281. See id. at 138.
282. Id. at231 n.18.
283. See William O'Neil, Divorce in the Progressive Era, in 3 DOMESTIC RELATIONS AND
LAW, supra note 126, at 376. I conclude that even though divorce became more common,
Foltz probably did not come forth and admit that she had been divorced in part because she
did not want to admit she had lied.
284. NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE 118 (1999).
285. Id. at 119.
286. Babcock briefly mentions the idea: "Romantically, she conceived the death of love as
physical, leaving her a widow. Practically, this self-presentation protected her from
recognition by her public, and perhaps even by herself, that she was unable to play devoted
wife to a limited man." Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 139.
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to enter the legal field would not increase the likelihood of divorce. 287 But
it seems too simple to say that the lie was pure strategy or that Foltz feared
a decline in social status, rather than being partly due to Foltz's
internalization of separate sphere ideology; women were supposed to be
devoted wives, even to less than perfect husbands.
Basch states that "in a culture that increasing[ly] invested middle-class
women with a powerful moral influence over their husbands, that valorized
the role of women in the domestic sphere, ... to succeed in divorce was
tantamount to a more fundamental sort of failure. ' 288 The fact that Foltz
hid her divorce can be seen as how she dealt with what she perceived as her
failure as a wife and a woman. To borrow Woolf's imagery, Foltz heard
the Angel whispering to her, "You failed at being a wife, at what you were
designed to do."
When Daniel McFarland was on trial for the murder of his wife's lover,
his defense centered around the idea that his wife should not have filed for
divorce. McFarland argued that it was the divorce that prompted him to
commit the murder, and thus his wife was partly to blame. He further
argued that even if he had engaged in marital misconduct, it was still not
reason enough to justify her actions. His counsel said:
'Woman never better fulfills her office as a guardian angel than
when she is watching over an erring and failing husband,' he
declared, citing the principle of womanly sacrifice. It is at the
moment when her husband first begins to fail that her influence
must be exerted 'and her arms be wound round him in a tighter and
more affectionate embrace to win him back.'
289
This is pure separate sphere ideology: woman as the self-sacrificing
creature. It seems likely that most women who came of age in this era
internalized some of this thinking, due to its pervasive nature. There is
evidence that at least the younger Foltz, who eloped at fifteen, internalized
some of the separate sphere ideology regarding men and women. An
interviewer wrote:
[A]s she drifted into young ladyhood, her ideas became more
romantic, and her dreams were not of oratory, or fame, or political
recognition. With a purely feminine ideal, she dreamed of a
287. Foltz wrote:
But we are told that if women go into the legal profession, it will destroy our
homes. Convince me of that and I will assign my cases.., for I realize the
supreme importance of the institution of home and I will not by example or
by precept do anything which will in the remotest degree injure that portion
of our social fabric ....
Id. at 138.
288. BASCH, supra note 284, at 117.
289. Id. at 70.
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handsome noble husband, who would cherish her and keep her
sheltered from the unknown world in a happy little home.290
Foltz said after the divorce that it had been difficult to "maintain not
only the little ones that came so fast, but also the man who should have
stood between her and the great unknown world."291 In both cases Foltz
depicts her ideal husband as standing between her and the world, as
protecting her from the world. Her ideal husband comes from pure
separate sphere ideology where the husband ventures into the unknown
world and the wife stays within her "happy little home."
Foltz's comments about divorce in general also support the argument
that she at least partially believed in the separate sphere notions relating to
marriage and divorce. In an interview she stated, "A great many women
have consulted me in regard to getting a divorce. They naturally come to
me when in trouble of that kind ....... I deem the marriage relation too
high and holy to be broken except for the very gravest of causes."
292
Foltz also explores the idea of divorce in her column Struggles and
Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer. She does not mention that she drafted and
lobbied for legislation that would require final divorce decrees be rendered
at the end of sixty days instead of one year.293 She, however, does spend
three months describing her second case, involving a young woman who
came to Foltz seeking a divorce. The memory was obviously an important
one for Foltz, as she spends almost as much time on this story as she does
describing the passage of the Woman's Lawyer Bill or discussing her battle
to attend Hastings.
The story began with a young wife telling Foltz that her husband
treated her in an inhumane and cruel manner. Foltz stated that after hearing
the tale she wanted to horse-whip the husband, "[hlowever, being just a
woman and a lawyer at that... I decided to let the law punish this mean
cruel husband."294 Foltz wrote a complaint that contained "at least one
dozen round lies" and only two true statements. 295 The complaint was
filed with the court and Foltz hurried home. She wrote, "[slomehow I felt
guilty... [t]here was an undefined feeling of remissness working in my
inmost soul.
29 6
The next morning Foltz received a message from her client's husband,
290. Ella Sterling Cummins, Clara Shortridge Foltz, SAN FRANCISCAN MAO. (ca 1883),
quoted in Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12, at 133.
291. Id. at 134.
292. Mrs. Foltz as a Lawyer, NEw NORTHWEST, reprinted in part from S.F. CHRON., Feb.
6, 1879, quoted in Babcock, Reconstructing, supra note 12 at 136.
293. See Woman to Lobby to Make Divorce Time Limit Short, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1917,
at 10.
294. Struggles, supra note 2, Mar. 1917, at 24. One has to wonder if she wanted to horse-
whip her own husband for all the pain he caused her.
295. Id. at Apr. 1917, at 25.
296. Id..
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asking if Foltz could arrange a meeting between himself and his wife.
Foltz also received a message from her client asking for Foltz's advice after
the husband had spent the night sitting on the client's porch. The
heartbroken client did not know what to do. Foltz arranged to have the
couple meet in her office, where the husband begged the wife's
forgiveness, "saying he had wronged the dearest little wife God had ever
given to a man., 297 Foltz's reaction was to forget that she was a lawyer and
did "what any other woman would have done-I cried.,
298
Foltz marched the couple down to the courthouse in order to dismiss
the case. When asked which party she represented, Foltz first stated that
she represented the husband, and then stated that she represented both
parties. Foltz eventually determined whom she was representing and was
able to get the case dismissed. She proclaimed, "[t]riumphantly I had won
my second case--or rather I should say, Love had won it for me."299 The
story ends with Foltz watching her "little client" drive away:
not as would-be divorcee, but as a dearly loved wife, reclining by
her husband's side, where she belonged... . One year later I
attended the christening of their baby daughter-Clara, in honor of
the lawyer who forgot which party she represented.00
Babcock does not mention this story at all in her discussion of Foltz's
divorce, and yet the story clearly had an impact on Foltz. It is hard to tell
whether the story is true or whether Foltz fabricated the story to show how
highly she valued marriage or whether it was wishful thinking. What is
apparent is that Foltz was more proud of the fact that she helped repair the
marriage than she was of her legal work. Foltz depicted the complaint as a
document mostly of lies, she was full of guilt after filing the complaint, and
was so overwhelmed with joy when she tried to dismiss the complaint that
she could not remember which spouse was her client. This is not a story of
great legal work. It is a great tale of romantic love. The husband saw that
he had a wonderful wife, and the wife returned to her proper sphere:
"reclining by her husband's side, where she belonged."
301
This is modified separate sphere ideology.. Pure separate sphere
ideology would not even have the wife filing for divorce. However, the
story reflects some of the tenets of separate sphere ideology, in that the
marriage was preserved when the wife forgave her husband despite him
supposedly locking her out of the house one night and slapping her, among
other cruelties. Foltz's client played the role of the proper Victorian
woman-self-sacrificing, submitting to her husband and enduring his
297. Id. May 1917, at 8.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
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wrongs. As was stated previously, "[w]oman never better fulfills her office
as a guardian angel than when she is watching over an erring and failing
husband.
,30 2
Foltz accepted some of the tenets of the cult of domesticity. She
believed that women were destined to be wives and mothers. Foltz
lamented that working had deprived her of time with her children. She
wrote:
The feeling that possesses me as I write is that of having lost more
for myself than I have gained for all women. I say truly, that all
the pleasure of my young motherhood I sacrificed for woman's
cause. I lost forever the opportunity to play with my children, to
romp the fields and gather the flowers ... 303
Foltz also believed that women should not do all the things that men
did. She argued that some of the tasks that women did during World War I
were "not naturally theirs and when the war is over they will gladly
surrender them to men.' ,304 She was a complex person who lived in an era
of change. It is not surprising that she has many reactions to separate
sphere ideology. We see her in direct rebellion against separate sphere
ideology. In Woolf s terminology killing the Angel. We see her
engineering a persona to exploit some of the notions of separate sphere
ideology. We also see Foltz embracing the Angel and what the Angel
represents.
V. CONCLUSION
When Barbara Babcock researches and interprets what Clara Foltz said
and did, she is looking for another first like herself. She is looking for a
feminist. The danger in this reading is that we miss who Foltz really was in
our effort to produce a heroine that fits our notion of feminist. Foltz strove
to fulfill the notions of what a Victorian woman was supposed to be:
modest, sentimental, and caring. At the same time she strove to be a
lawyer, which required her to enter the male sphere; to be assertive,
rational and objective. Separate sphere ideology told her that her goals to
be a woman and a lawyer were mutually exclusive. It is therefore not
surprising that there is:
[d]isjuncton-between what she said and did.., and even
between what she most fervently proclaimed at one point and
another .... In her speeches and writing, she pledges allegiance to
the idea of woman at the center of the home: noble, serene, learned,
302. BASCH, supra note 284, at 70.
303. Struggles, supra note 2, Mar. 1918, at 9.
304. Foltz, Certain Kinds of Laborfor Women Wrong and Unnatural, NEw AM. WOMAN,
Dec. 1916, at 19, quoted in Schwartz et al., 27 HASTINGS L. J. at 563.
raising manly sons and virtuous daughters .... At the same time
she insisted that her life was exemplary for the "new woman,"
never hinting at how she or others could be at once in the home and
on the field.3°5
Babcock seems disturbed by the fact that Foltz's thinking was
disjointed and that Foltz had no overarching sense of mission like other
members of the women's movement; however, she admits that this level of
confusion makes Foltz a heroine to which modem women can relate.30 6 I
argue that this reading underestimates the power of the cult of domesticity
and therefore underestimates the strength Foltz had to find in order to
challenge the notions inherent within separate sphere ideology. If she had
rejected the entire proposition, it would have been much easier for her, but
she did not. She believed in the role of wife and mother, and somehow at
the same time believed in her right, as well as her ability, to be a lawyer.
As I researched Clara Foltz and her struggles to be a woman, lawyer
and suffragette in a culture that stated that women should be confined to the
home, I kept thinking about Virginia Woolf and her battles with the
"Angel." I kept wondering if Foltz felt as Woolf did. Did Foltz feel like
she was battling the Angel and killing her? At other times did she listen to
the advice of the Angel in order to expand her sphere? And at times did
she embrace the ideas of the Angel? It seems that when her work and the
writings about her are read as a whole, this is the image that emerges. She
was more than the practical lawyer who was just dealing in what would
"sell;" she was complicated and struggled to define who and what she was.
I fear Barbara Babcock may not like my interpretation of Foltz, but
perhaps she will feel better when I tell her that even though Foltz was not a
feminist with an "overarching sense of mission" and seemed to believe in
the some of the tenets of separate sphere ideology, she nonetheless serves
as a role model for women at Hastings. Ten years ago, when the Hastings
Women's Law Journal was founded by Diane Bessette, Amy Brown and
Deborah Kochan, they faced opposition from the Hastings faculty.3°7 They
drew upon the story of Foltz's struggle for inspiration and, like her, refused
to be intimidated by the establishment. When the establishment told the
women they would not support the women's efforts to have a women's law
journal, the founders, like Foltz, forged ahead and forced Hastings to
recognize the Journal. 0 8 They dedicated the inaugural issue of the Journal
to the memory of Foltz.3°
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The more I thought about this, I realized that there were other
similarities between Foltz, Bessette and Kochan. All three have or had
their own practices, are mothers and had to discover how to balance life as
mother and life as lawyer. Like Foltz, the founders of the Journal have
been confused, found their vision clouded at times and found it comforting
to discover that Foltz struggled in this manner as well. Perhaps in this lies
the greatest danger in reading Foltz in a less complex, more unified way-
we lose that which makes her so much more than a first upon a pedestal.

